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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
it will be seen that this standard is too harsh or too difficult to follow and
the real standard remains a complete, transactional immunity. A future case
might so decide.
William P. Bivins, Jr.
Goldfarb Fights the Bar
On January 15, 1972, Lewis H. and Ruth S. Goldfarb, residents of Virginia,
purchased a home in the Reston subdivision of Fairfax County, Virginia. They
proceeded through the normal transactions of the purchase of their home,
which included a title examination, for which a local attorney charged a fee cal-
culated in accordance with the effective minimum fee schedule published by
the local bar association. The Goldfarbs then brought suit under the Sherman
Act' on their own behalf, and pursuant to rule 23(b) (2) and (3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all prospective homebuyers
in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area and all similarly situated residents
of Reston, Virginia, against the Virginia State, Fairfax County, Alexandria,
and Arlington County bar associations, complaining that the defendant's com-
bined and conspired to raise, fix, and maintain the fees for legal services
performed by members of the association. This conspiracy was allegedly ac-
complished by circulating and adhering to published and recommended fee
schedules, by establishing local committees to investigate and enforce alleged
violations of the fee schedule, and by subjecting any member who habitually
failed to abide by the schedule to sanctions including revocation of the license
to practice law. The Alexandria and Arlington County bar associations agreed
to a consent judgment, and the district court dismissed them as defendants,
requiring them to cancel their existing fee schedules and enjoining them from
any further adoption, publication, or distribution of schedules of minimum or
suggested fees. As to the remaining defendants, the court held: Minimum
fee schedules propose a floor upon which professional fees should be set, and,
therefore, constitute a form of price fixing which is inconsistent with the
Sherman Act prohibitions against anticompetitive activities. Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
I. THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Judicial Interpretation of Congressional Intent
The Sherman Act has been deemed to be the "Magna Carta of free enter-
prise"' and the protector of the public against "those abnormal contracts and
combinations which tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called
competition-the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an
honest desire for gain."' Since its enactment in 1890, the Act has undergone
1Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
'United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
'United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923).
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countless interpretations and applications.! The Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed that the design of Congress in enacting the Sherman Act was the
preservation of free competition, by making unlawful those restraints of trade
or commerce already condemned under the common law.5 In addition, most
"business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services.. ." were made illegal as being characteristic
of the common law restraints.! Congress derived its authority for the Sherman
Act from its power to regulate commerce among the states.8 Although Congress
attempted to encompass all varieties of restraints on commerce,' it remained
for the courts to interpret what was rather vaguely articulated in the Act."
B. Judicial Regulation of Commerce Under the Sherman Act
Several issues found in cases under the Sherman Act have been quite per-
plexing for the courts. Four issues arising in the interpretation of the Act are
of particular importance to the determination of whether a violation has oc-
curred. These are: (1) what activities are encompassed within the meaning of
"trade or commerce" as the terms are used in the Act; (2) when is trade or
commerce "among the several states," so as to bring such activities within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act; (3) which activities are per se violations of
the Sherman Act and which require some inquiry as to their reasonableness
or purpose; and (4) which activities are regulated or promoted by the states
so as to be exempt from the Act under the rule of Parker v. Brown.1
The Meaning of "Trade or Commerce." In determining whether a particular
activity falls within the meaning of "trade" as used in section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the court may be required to determine the economic or commercial nature
of the activity.'" A recent decision held the Act not applicable to the activity
' In fact, the Supreme Court has admonished legal researchers to be wary of the general
language in Sherman Act cases. "[3E1ach case arising under the Sherman Act must be de-
termined upon the particular facts disclosed by the record, and that the opinions in those
cases must be read in the light of their facts. ... Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
'See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897). See also 1 I. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES S 4.01 (1949).
'Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
'See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8. Pursuant to this constitutional grant of authority, § 1 of the
Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
'Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
"' Judicial interpretation of the broad terms of the Act allows the law to adapt to "the
changing types of commercial production and distribution that have evolved since its pas-
sage." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956). "[The
courts have been given by Congress wide powers in monopoly regulation. The very broad-
ness of terms such as restraint of trade, substantial competition and purpose to monopolize
have placed upon courts the responsibility to . . . avoid the evils at which Congress aimed."
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 526 (1948).
11317 U.S. 341 (1943).
"The participation in lobbying for laws which would be injurious to competitors was
1973)
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of college accreditations. 2 The court there felt the design of Congress in enact-
ing the Sherman Act was to restrain the business world rather than the non-
commercial activities of the liberal arts and the learned professions. The
Supreme Court, in providing baseball an exemption to the antitrust laws,
said: "[Plersonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of com-
merce."" In FTC v. Raladam the Court distinguished a profession from a
trade and found the characteristics of a physician's "business" to exclude such
a practice from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws."
There is also an important distinction between the sale of personal and
professional services and the sale of commodities by a professional, under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n'H
the court held that a pharmacist who fixes the price of prescription drugs ac-
cording to pricing schedules formulated by pharmaceutical associations, is not
exempt from the Sherman Act, though he is engaged in the practice of a
learned profession. Extending the application of the Act still further, the court
in Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States said: "Although
dispensed by one who requires special training for some aspects of his occupa-
tion, the prescription drug no less than the law book, the text on bacteriology,
or the handbook on accounting, is an article of trade or commerce."'" Both
courts declined to comment on the legality of price schedules for professional
services while holding an agreement among learned professionals to fix com-
modity prices a violation of the Act.
In several cases the Supreme Court has had to determine whether the sale
of personal services was included within the section 3 meaning of "trade or
commerce." Congress enacted section 3" to apply the Sherman Act's prohibi-
tions to the District of Columbia. Under the Constitution, power is reserved
to Congress to exercise "exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over...
the District of Columbia .... '" Therefore, section 3 is not inhibited by the
interpretations of the commerce clause, as is section 1. In Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States' the Supreme Court noted that "trade" often
is used in a broader sense than allowed by the meaning of commerce under
the Constitution. The Court adopted, for purposes of section 3 of the Act,
the meaning attributed to "trade" by Justice Story in The Nymph" where it
found not to be a violation of the Sherman Act in Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The Court held the "essential dissimilarity" of the rail-
roads' activities to "agreements traditionally condemned" by § 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
tected them. Id. at 136.
" Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
'Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 209 (1922). And in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 271 (1972), reaffirming base-
ball's exempt status, the Court noted that Federal Baseball has "been cited, not unfavorably,
with respect to the practice of law .... "
15 283 U.S. 643 (1931). The Court held that "[medical practitioners) follow a profession
and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of making or vending remedies but
in prescribing them." Id. at 653.
tr201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
17306 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
"15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20286 U.S. 427 (1932).
2118 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (S.D.N.Y. 1863).
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was held to mean "any occupation, employment, or business . . .carried on
for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or
in the learned professions . 2.. .""
This broader meaning of "trade" under section 3, excluding the learned
professions, was reaffirmed in United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate
Boards,"3 where the Court found the business of a real estate agent rendering
personal services to be included within the scope of section 3. However, while
noting that the court of appeals in United States v. American Medical Ass'n
interpreted "trade" under section 3 as "all occupations in which men are
engaged for a livelihood,"' the Supreme Court expressly withheld its opinion
on the correctness of including the professions within this interpretation."3
Two years later, in its opinion in United States v. Oregon State Medical Socy'
the Supreme Court did indicate that the relationship between a physician and
his patients involves ethical considerations quite different from those prevailing
in ordinary commercial matters."
Thus, it is clear that the question of including professional services within
the meaning of trade in section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act can only be re-
solved by a court after thorough judicial analysis of these prior decisions.
Trade or Commerce "°Among the Several States." The commerce clause of the
Constitution both authorizes and limits the application of section 1 of the
Sherman Act to any, and only, activities which encumber the free flow of inter-
state commerce."2 Thus, a court may find this jurisdictional requirement satis-
fied by pure interstate commerce, or the court may be required to examine
local activities which are alleged to restrain the flow of interstate commerce.
Where the activity in question, viewed alone, is intrastate or local in nature,
the courts apply two basic tests to determine whether the activity has a re-
straining effect on the flow of interstate commerce. " The "in commerce" or
qualitative test allows local activity having even an insubstantial effect on the
flow of commerce to be examined under the Sherman Act if the activity is
2 286 U.S. at 36.
23339 U.S. 485 (1950).
u110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See also United States v. American Medical
Ass'n, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cit. 1942), afl'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Supreme Court
on review of the latter declined to comment on the lower court's inclusion of the professions
within the S 3 meaning of "trade," as it was found to be irrelevant to the disposition of the
case. The Court did hold the defendants liable as the purpose and effect of their conspiracy
was to restrain competition outside of their organization. 317 U.S. 519 (1943). A contrary
result was reached, however, when the practice of medicine was attacked under § 1 in
Riggall v. Washington County Med. Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cit. 1957), where the court
held: "The practice of .. . [medicine] is neither trade nor commerce within Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act .
25 339 U.S. at 491-92.
26343 U.S. 326 (1952).
" 1d. at 336.
s The Sherman Act renders only restraints of trade "among the several states" illegal,
but certain local activities within one state have been found to have an effect on this trade,
and therefore are encompassed by the Act. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
29See Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
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within the flow of interstate commerce." Under the "affecting commerce' or
quantitative test, local activity will violate the Act only if it substantially affects
an interstate commerce market.' Therefore, to sustain its jurisdiction in the
absence of pure interstate commerce, the court must find minimally that the
local activity is either within the flow of interstate commerce or significantly
affecting it.' While Congress exercised "all the power it possessed" in enacting
the Sherman Act to restrain trust and monopoly agreements," it has become
the duty of the courts to determine whether the intrastate and local activities
of each defendant exert an unlawful influence upon interstate commerce."
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Violation. The Sherman Act has been re-
ferred to not only as a prohibition against certain activities, but as an actual
congressional limitation of rights which need to be restrained due to their
dangerous nature." In Standard Oil Co.. v. United States," an early case in the
history of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court determined that Congress had
merely defined the legal limits of possible interstate activities which should
fall within the Act. The Court was thus left unburdened by precise definitions
and could interpret particular restraints in light of their overall reasonableness.
This pronouncement of a rule of reason as a test of legality of restraints on
trade was further explained in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,7
where the Supreme Court held that the legality of an agreement could not be
determined merely on the basis of whether it restrained trade. "Every agreement
"0The Supreme Court indicated in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940), that § 1 of the Sherman Act condemns the character of the restraint, not its
effect, and, therefore, the amount of interstate commerce affected is immaterial. See Mon-
tague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904); Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915); Steers v. United States, 192 F. 1 (6th Cir. 1911).
"In considering its jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the court in Rosemound Sand
& Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972), determined
that a violation of the Act would be inherent in the intrastate activities involved only if
there was a "direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 418. See also
Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959); Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeyman Barbers, 195 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Mo. 1961),
afl'd, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cit. 1962), and ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DE-
VELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 38-39 (1968).
" "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze." United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n,
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
23Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932). See also
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). But cf. Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
3" "In such legislation [regulating interstate commerce] Congress has sometimes left it
to the courts to determine whether the intrastate activities have the prohibited effect on the
commerce, as in the Sherman Act." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941).
'Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
36221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911):
The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to which
it refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used in
the statute leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, that it was expressly
designed not to unduly limit the application of the act by precise definition,
but while clearly fixing a standard, that is, by defining the ulterior bound-
aries which could not be transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be deter-
mined by the light of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty
to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statutes in every given
case whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of
the statute.37 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as... may suppress or even destroy competition.""
However, the rule of reason is not applied in cases where the restraint
consisted of price-fixing. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 9 the Court
held the Sherman Act prohibits price-fixing by those engaged in an interstate
trade or business, without regard to the reasonableness of the agreement."
The Court observed that the necessity of determining the reasonableness of
prices set by agreement would place an excessive burden on the Government
in enforcing the law under changing economic conditions and would neces-
sarily make the legality of many agreements contingent upon the imprecise
choice of philosophies by the Court. 1 But regardless of the burden of proof
problems, "[plrice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used
even in an informal manner to restrain competition."' Generally, the mere
"8 Id. at 238. In applying the test "the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable." Id.
3'273 U.S. 392 (1927).
'0 Id. at 398. Thus, where the courts find evidence of price fixing, it will be deemed
illegal without regard to the particular purpose of the agreement or the reasonableness of
the prices. In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Black stated:
[Tlhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type
of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an in-
credibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire
history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. Among the practices
which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of them-
selves [is] price fixing ....
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also United States v. Con-
tainer Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. National Ass'n Real Estate
Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); 1 I. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 13.26-.35 (1949); E. HODGES, THE ANTITRUST ACT AND THE
SUPREME COURT 16-22 (1941); Note, Price Fixing and the Illegal Per Se Concept, 5 U.
RICH. L. REV. 422 (1971). However, in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the district court
found an exception to the per se illegality of tying arrangements as expressed in Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), when viewing the unique circumstances
of a new industry. The court said: "[Wlhile the per se rule should be followed in almost
all cases, the court must always be conscious of the fact that a case might arise in which
the facts indicate that an injustice would be done by blindly accepting the per se rule." 187
F. Supp. at 556. The court therefore allowed testimony and argument on the issue of the
reasonableness of the arrangement. See also 1 I. TOULMIN, supra, 5 13.0; E. HODGES, supra,
at 7-16; ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, supra note 31. at 7-9.
41 273 U.S. at 397-98. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940), the Court held that "fu)nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the pur-
pose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of
a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.42 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 338 (1969). However,
in two separate opinions two Justices objected to the application of the per se rule to an
exchange of price and market information. Justice Fortas concurred with the result of the
case but preferred to make clear that "[a]bsent per se violation, proof is essential that the
practise resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade." Id. at 339. Justice Marshall dissented
saying: "I do not believe that the agreement in the present case is so devoid of potential
benefit or so inherently harmful that we are justified in condemning it without proof that
it was entered for the purpose of restraining price competition or that it actually had that
NOTES19731
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exchange of price information necessarily tends to stabilize prices and thereby
"chill the vigor of price competition."43 Thus, the Supreme Court, having had
considerable opportunity to review various types of price-fixing arrangements,
generally considers them a per se violation and will not look to the purpose
or effect for which they are intended."
The Parker v. Brown Exemption. Where the state authorizes a particular
activity and proceeds actively to supervise or regulate that activity in order to
protect the public's interests, the Sherman Act provisions are not applicable.
It was held in Parker v. Brown that there is "nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."'
However, quasi-governmental agencies such as port authorities or boards of
trade, which are created or sanctioned by state law, are generally found
to be too far removed from the regulation of the sovereign to constitute
arms of the state." The Supreme Court in Parker upheld an agriculture prora-
tion program which both restricted the competition among raisin producers and
maintained a minimum price level. The program was established and super-
vised under state legislative sanction. The Court said: "In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an un-
expressed purpose to nullify a state control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress."" In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier' the
Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina statute under which all automobile
insurance companies were required to adhere to a schedule of rates and stan-
dards, promulgated by a rating bureau composed of all the insurance com-
panies, as approved by the state insurance commissioner. Because the rating
bureau was established and administered under the active supervision of the
state, the Sherman Act provisions which condemn private anticompetitive
activities were found by the court to be inapplicable.49
II. GOLDFARB V. VIRGINIA STATE BAR
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, which concerned the Fairfax County and
effect. The agreement in this case was to supply, when requested, price data for identified
customers." Id. at 341-42.
"Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972). But cf. the discussion note 42 supra.
""[For over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to
the principle that price fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and
that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were de-
signed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
"317 U.S. at 350.
"See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962);
Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cit. 1959).
41317 U.S. at 351.
11361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966), aff'g 242 F. Supp. 73
(E.D.N.C. 1965).
"The court stated: "The central question in both cases (Parker and Allstate) is whether
a program of regulation established and actively supervised by a state is subject to the
antitrust laws. Absent congressional action departing from the rule of Parker v. Brown,
the North Carolina statutory plan is clearly valid." 361 F.2d at 872.
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the Virginia state bar associations, it was necessary for the court to consider
the basic requirements of the Sherman Act as they would relate to the alleged
misconduct. To sustain its jurisdiction under the Act, the court was required
to determine whether the practice of law was within the meaning of "trade"
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and whether the title examination by
Goldfarb's attorney constituted sufficient trade or commerce among the several
states to bring the activity within the regulations of the statute. Upon establish-
ing the interstate nature of the activity and finding no exemption of the specific
activity from the Act,"0 the court then considered whether there was in fact
a restraint imposed on interstate commerce by the existence of the alleged
conspiracy.
Were the Legal Services a Trade Under the Sherman Act? The applicability
of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act to a profession such as law had been
impliedly questioned by the courts prior to Goldfarb."5 The court in Goldfarb,
however, reasoned that professional legal services are within the meaning of
"trade" in the Sherman Act because of the court's disbelief that a minimum
fee schedule was in itself professional."' Defendants contended that the render-
ing of professional legal services should be distinguished from the sale of
commodities in the commercial avenues. However, to the court this appeared
to be inconsistent with the defendants' position that a minimum fee schedule
could properly be referred to by the professional in determining his fee. The
court felt the existence of a fee schedule rendered meaningless the differences
in "abilities, worth and energies" of those rendering the services, and allowed an
attorney to charge a client more than his services were worth.53 The fact that
an attorney might charge more than he is "worth" by relying on a fee schedule
is hardly an inherent evil within the schedules.54 Congress, in enacting section
6 of the Clayton Act which exempts organized labor from the antitrust laws, 5
allows unions to fix the starting hourly pay of manual laborers, manufacturing
employees, truck drivers, airline pilots, and other workers, without regard to
" The exemption could be by congressional action (e.g., the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970)), or by congressional inaction (e.g., the baseball exemption
was continued by the Supreme Court partly due to this factor, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972)), or by implied judicial action (e.g., the exemption of professional services up to
1973), or by state action (e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). As stated by the
Court: "[T1he typical method adopted by Congress when it has lifted the ban of the Sher-
man Act is the scrutiny and approval of designated public representatives." United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940). See also Seamans, First Aid
to the Plaintiff, 33 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 48-55 (1967).
" See notes 12-15, 22, 25, and 27 supra, and accompanying text with regard to previous
implications concerning the application of the Sherman Act to the practice of law.
" 355 F. Supp. at 495.
58/d,
14There are many instances where courts have recognized that though not bound by
minimum fee schedules, the bar by promulgating such schedules does aid the court in de-
termining a reasonable fee. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958);
Krieger v. Colby, 106 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Lucom v. Potter, 131 So. 2d 724
(Fla. 1961); Whittle v. Whittle, 272 Ala. 32, 128 So. 2d 92 (1961).
" "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. ...
[Nor shall such [labor] organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 15
U.S.C. S 17 (1970).
1973]
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differences in "abilities, worth and energies."" Fee setting may be the "least
'learned' part of the profession";" ' however, where the activity is essentially
non-commercial, its commercial aspects should not bring the activity within
the scope of the Sherman Act."8
Was Interstate Commerce Affected? The court did not find the title examina-
tion performed by Goldfarb's attorney to be "in the flow of interstate com-
merce." Rather, the court emphasized the fact that most lenders, prior to
granting a loan, require such a title examination to be made, and as most of
the home loans in this area of Virginia came from sources outside the state
and were guaranteed by federal agencies located in Washington D.C., interstate
commerce was sufficiently affected." Of course some of the same arguments
might have been raised in the National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards case in-
volving the commissions of real estate agents acting as brokers in the sale,
exchange, lease, and management of real property in the District of Columbia.
But the Court there found: "The fact that no interstate commerce is involved
is not a barrier to this suit."" This, of course, was because the action there
was brought in the District of Columbia under section 3 of the Sherman Act
which requires no interstate commerce for its application, but the inference
as to the lack of any effect on such commerce by the same type of activities
is clear.
Was the Parker v. Brown Exemption Available? Under its statutory authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to govern the conduct of attorneys prac-
ticing law in Virginia, the Virginia Supreme Court empowered and required
the Virginia State Bar to investigate violations of the standards of conduct
of the court and the opinions of the bar on questions of ethics."' It was to this
authority that local bar associations looked for enforcement of their minimum
fee schedules. Though accepting as fact that the defendant Fairfax County bar
association had never taken any action against a member for failing to follow
its minimum fee schedule, the court found the local bar association to be in
violation of the Sherman Act. The court concluded that the rationale behind
Parker v. Brown applied equally as well to a state's judicial actions and, there-
fore, in this case to the Virginia State Bar created by the Virginia Supreme
Court under its statutory powers. The Parker exemption was held to include
56 See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 84 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C.
1949).
57355 F. Supp. at 495.
-1 Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'ns of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
1 355 F. Supp. at 494.
60339 U.S. 485, 488 (1950).
"I In Virginia, the State Supreme Court of Appeals is authorized to "prescribe ... rules
and regulations organizing and governing . . . the Virginia State Bar, composed of the
attorney at law of this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose
of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by
the Court . . . to a court of competent jurisdiction for such proceedings as may be neces-
sary .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1972 repl. vol.).
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only the state bar, as the county bar association was a private undertaking and
not expressly empowered by the state supreme court."
Was the Minimum Fee Schedule a Restraint of Trade? The court in Goldfarb
initially concluded that minimum fee schedules were a form of price-fixing and
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. This conclusion seemed to be based on
the presumption that the fee schedule was the sole criterion for setting a fee,
and that such a schedule was unprofessional. However, the court may have
overlooked the relevant economic realities of the pricing process by attorneys
for their services." A minimum fee schedule is intended to be mere evidence
of the customary charges of the bar for similar services within a particular
locality. As such, it was one of six factors to be considered in fixing the amount
of the fee under the old ABA Canon 12," and now, under the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility, a fee schedule is merely one
of eight factors to be looked to under Ethical Consideration 2-18, and one of
eight guides for the attorney under Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B)." In any
event, the minimum fee schedule is not intended to be mandatory."
The Virginia State Bar, in Opinion No. 98, fully approved of the old
ABA Canon 12 and of the circumstances in which an attorney would be justi-
fied in not following a suggested minimum fee schedule due to other ethical
considerations." Opinion No. 170 of the Virginia State Bar, however, stated
that the state bar raised a presumption of misconduct on the part of any
attorney who habitually failed to follow a minimum fee schedule.6 The Fair-
fax County bar association relied on the state bar for any enforcement of its
62 355 F. Supp. at 495-96.
, It has been noted that "the judicial convenience and ready predictability that are made
possible by per se rules are not such overriding considerations in antitrust law as to justify
their promulgation without careful prior consideration of the relevant economic realities in
the light of the basic policy and goals of the Sherman Act." United States v. Topco Asso-
ciates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 614 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"In 1969 the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were restructured into the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility which has nine basic Canons, with Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules pertaining to each Canon. Under this new Code, the Canons represent the
general standard of conduct expected of all lawyers, the Ethical Considerations are "aspira-
tional in character" and offer the practicing lawyer principles which he can look to in spe-
cific situations, and the Disciplinary Rules are intended to establish the minimum level of
conduct expected of all lawyers, any of whom falling below this standard may be subject
to disciplinary action. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary
Statement (1970).
'According to Ethical Consideration 2-18, and Disciplinary Rule 2-106, an attorney
may be in violation of his professional ethics and subject to sanctions, if, in fact, he follows
only the minimum fee schedule. See ABA Formal Opinion 323, 56 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1970).
66 In Formal Opinion 323 the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association stated: "ITlhe Committee has no hesitancy in holding that mere failure to fol-
low a minimum fee schedule, even when habitual, cannot, standing alone and absent evi-
dence of misconduct afford a basis for disciplinary action." 56 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1970). The
Committee also noted its intention that any reference to disciplinary sanction, by a state
or local bar, for an attorney failing to follow a minimum fee schedule should be discontinued.
67 Virginia State Bar, Opinion No. 98 (1960). But the Opinion went on to censure such
reductions in the customary charges of the bar for similar services, where such was done
with the intent to solicit business in that manner.
" VIRGINIA STATE BAR, OPINION NO. 170 (1971). This was a direct departure from
ABA Opinion 323 and makes the minimum fee schedules promulgated on the local levels
in Virginia closer to a floor for prices of legal services than fee schedules in other states
which are to be used by lawyers only as envisioned in Opinion 323 of the ABA.
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fee schedule. Its adoption by the local bar was merely a service to the members
and without any sanctions on the local level for its enforcement.
The Supreme Court has held that whether penalties are imposed for non-
adherence is immaterial where a schedule fixing the prices of goods or services
is found."5 Therefore, the question is not whether the attorneys could be subject
to discipline for not following the fee schedule or considering it as a factor
in fixing their fees, but rather whether the minimum fee schedule, incorporated
as it was within the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituted a form of
pricefixing. The court in Goldfarb left no doubt as to the answer to this
question. The court held that "[mlinimum fee schedules are a form of price
fixing and therefore inconsistent with antitrust statutes prohibiting anti-com-
petitive activities .. . .The minimum fee schedule actually proposes a floor
upon which professional fees should be set.""0 Price-fixing by professionals
has been considered prior to this case and found to be illegal under certain
circumstances."' Such an application of the Sherman Act to the professional
occupations and any encouragement of businesslike competition has been con-
sidered by other courts and has been disapproved of."2
III. CONCLUSION
It would seem a plausible conclusion that minimum fee schedules, when
considered in their proper light as merely advisory schedules as to the "custo-
mary charges of the bar," are not per se violations of the Sherman Act.
The fee schedules may, in fact, represent the minimum price attorneys will
accept for some of their services; however, there are many factors which
should not be overlooked in considering whether the schedules are proper.
That such a price may represent the only reasonable and feasible fee which
an attorney, young or old, could charge and still maintain a profitable enter-
prise in light of the education, experience, time, and effort required for the
task is one practical consideration. The fact that courts must fix attorneys' fees
based upon educated opinions and that attorneys are obligated in many in-
stances to provide their services to indigent clients for a statutory fee would
"°United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1950).
See also Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960), where
the court rejected the auto dealers' contention that their agreed price list was lawful in the
absence of proof that the list actually fixed prices. The court found the price list to be an
agreed starting point for prices, and that such a list, where followed, restricted the dealers'
judgment in pricing their cars and, therefore, was a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 132.
70 355 F. Supp. at 493.
"[T)here is no defense to price-fixing on the ground that it is reasonable or that it
is being done by professionals . . . .We do not decide that every action of professionals
is within the reach of the Sherman Act. We do decide that an agreement among professionals
to fix a commodity price is." Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d
379, 385-86 (9th Cit. 1962).
712 In Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935), the
Court said: "the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception,
but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members
into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous."
And in United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952), the court noted:
"This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world may be
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession." The court in Levin v. Doctors Hosp.,
Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), found efforts of a profession to raise its standards
to be commendable though such efforts limited the practice of podiatrists in the hospital.
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